# Speech Act Metonymy in Biscuit Conditionals*

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**Choi, Youngju & Joh, Yoon-kyoung. (2016). Speech Act Metonymy in Biscuit Conditionals.** *The Linguistic Association of Korea Journal, 24*(4), 81-102. Biscuit conditionals are distinguished from indicative conditionals in that their consequent clauses are not dependent on conditional clauses while they are in indicative conditionals. In the example of the biscuit conditionals, *If you are hungry, there are biscuits on the sideboard,* it is apparent that the existence of biscuits on the sideboard does not depend on one's hunger. This paper demonstrates that the conditional clause is metonymically interpreted as the question *where can I find food?* and the consequent clause as the answer *there are biscuits on the sideboard.* Then the conditional will be construed as *If your question is, where can I find food, then my answer to you is, there are biscuits on the sideboard,* leading to the conclusion that biscuit conditionals behave like indicative conditionals, with their consequent clauses having dependency on their conditional clauses: If the question is not "where can I find food?" the answer will not be "there are biscuits on the sideboard. How the conditional and consequent clauses of biscuit conditionals are interpreted as question-answer pairs will be explained based on speech act metonymy.

**Key Words:** biscuit conditionals, speech act metonymy, scenario for questions

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# 1. Data and Definition

DeRose and Grandy (1999: 405) illustrate biscuit conditionals in (1) in comparison to indicative conditionals in (2). In the following examples, consequent clauses are the same but different antecedent clauses make them distinguished.

(1) a. There are biscuits on the sideboard if you are hungry.
    b. If you are interested, there's a good documentary on PBS tonight.
    c. Oswald shot Kennedy, if that's what you're asking me.
(2) a. There are biscuits on the sideboard if Bill hasn't moved them.
    b. If the TV guide is accurate, there's a good documentary on PBS tonight.
    c. Oswald shot Kennedy, if there hasn't been enormous conspiracy.

The contrast between the two conditionals can be made obvious when the antecedent clause is false. When it comes to biscuit conditionals, it is merely a joke to ask what happens if the antecedent clause is not true. For instance, as DeRose and Grandy (1999) phrase, the questions in (3) are not proper under normal circumstances. Yet, with indicative conditionals, it makes perfect sense to question what happens if the antecedent is false, even though the answer can be "I do not know."

(3) a. Where are the biscuits if I don't want any?
    b. What's on PBS if I'm not interested?
    c. Who shot Kennedy if that's not what I am asking?

In the literature, more examples of biscuit conditionals have been discussed as in (4). The common attribute of the biscuit conditionals is that the consequent clause is always true, regardless of the truth value of the antecedent clause. That is, the truth of the consequent clause is not contingent on the truth of the conditional clause, unlike indicative conditionals.

(4) a. If you need anything else later, my name is Kate.

  b. If your child is sick, the children's hospital is conducting a study of
   an investigational medication.
  c. If I don't see you any more, have a good vacation.

  As shown above, biscuit conditionals are interesting data in linguistics. Even though a number of claims have already been made on this phenomenon, we would like to conduct a new research developing Joh (2011) since it seems that we have a better approach to explain them based on the concept of metonymy.


# 2. Previous Studies

  There have been many researches on biscuit conditionals which seem deviated from normal indicative conditionals. As we will see, most of the previous literature has dealt with biscuit conditionals under speech act theories. Even though it is true that much attention concerning biscuit conditionals has been paid to their speech act properties, however, it is not the case that they can accurately characterize biscuit conditionals. Criticizing the speech act accounts, more attempts have been made to account for biscuit conditionals from different points of view. In the following, we will discuss two new perspectives: one concerns topicality of biscuit conditionals and the other argues that biscuit conditionals are disguised conversations. The previous studies that will be examined in this section do not exhaust all the previous literature on biscuit conditionals but will be enough to provide directions to the current study.

## 2.1. Speech Act

  Under the theories of speech act, largely two approaches have been proposed on biscuit conditionals. One approach advocated by Ross (1970), Lakoff (1972), Sadock (1974), Comrie (1986), Van der Auwera (1986), Iatridou (1991), etc. argues that biscuit conditionals can be characterized by underlying lexical performative sentences. The other approach advanced by Grice (1967), Dummet (1973), Bach and Harnish (1979), Horn (1989),  Bach (1999), Siegel (2006) etc. claims that the

consequent clause of biscuit conditionals should be classified as an assertion. We will call the former a performative approach and the latter, an assertion account, following Siegel (2006).

According to the performative approach, the utterance in (1a) can roughly be translated as in (5).

(5) If you are hungry, I say to you there are biscuits on the sideboard.

However, Bach and Harnish (1979), Boër and Lycan (1980), Portner (2004), and many others refute them for the reason that such paraphrases with explicit performatives are not appropriate all the time. For instance, as they claim, the biscuit conditional in (6a) can hardly be paraphrased into (6b). At the intuitive level, we can judge that the waiter's current act of saying that his name is James can hardly be conditional on the customer's need for the future.

(6) a. If you need anything else later, my name is James.
    b. If you need anything else later, I say to you that my name is James.

Siegel (2006) detects another serious limitation on this approach. To diagnose performative sentences, the adverb *hereby* is often used. It is generally admitted that only the utterances that can occur with the adverb *hereby* can be judged to be performatives. The performative utterance in (7a), for example, can be used with the adverb *hereby*. However, some biscuit conditionals such as (7b) and (7c) cannot be used with *hereby*. The awkwardness of the adverb *hereby* in the consequents of the biscuit conditionals in (7b) and (7c) seriously question whether they are indeed performatives.

(7) a. I hereby say to you that my name is James.
    b. *If you need anything else later, my name is hereby James.
    c. *If you need anything else later, I hereby say to you that my name is James.

On the other hand, the assertion approach claims that the consequent clauses of biscuit conditionals can further be paraphrased with an abstract operator like

ASSERT as shown in (8).

(8) If you are hungry, ASSERT (there are biscuits on the sideboard.)

Yet, there have been considerable debate whether biscuit conditionals are actually used to assert the propositions conveyed in the consequent clauses. Concerning this, McCready (2004) comes up with counter-examples in Japanese. In Japanese, both *yoku* and *yokumo* can deliver the feeling of surprise but the restriction imposed on them is that they can only occur with assertions. Yet, it is observed that *yoku* and *yokumo* cannot used in consequent clauses of biscuit conditionals as exemplified in (9). This seems to tell us that the consequent clauses of biscuit conditionals are not assertion sentences.

(9) (Mosi) onaka-ga suit-mono-na-ra
    (If) stomach-Nom empty-Nominalizer-Cop-Condition
    reezooko-ni yoku* pizza-ga aru-mono-da
    fridge-Loc surpirse pizza-Nom exist-Nominalizer-Cop
    'If you are hungry, there is, [amazingly to me*] pizza in the fridge.'

Modifying the previous assertion approaches, Siegel (2006) claims that variables over potential acts are to be induced via a rule of accommodation like (10). In terms of (10), when the antecedent clause and the consequent clause of a conditional do not fit together in an ordinary way, a variable is introduced and the induced variable is eventually existentially closed, yielding a representation like (11).

(10) If B is a sentence of English with the morpho-syntactic shape of an assertion and $^\wedge\beta$ is its translation, then $a$ is an assertion of p ∧ p = $^\wedge\beta$, is also a possible translation of B, where $a$ varies over assertions, $p$ varies over propositions, and *is an assertion of* is the relation between assertions and propositions such that if x is an assertion of y, then y is the propositional content of x.
(11) If you are hungry, [there's an (relevant/salient) assertion that] there are biscuits on the sideboard.

However, Ebert, Enriss and Hinterwimmer (2008) discuss problems of all the assertion approaches since they find many counter-examples. For instance, the biscuit conditional in (12) is not an assertion but a command since it can be followed by the utterances in (13).

(12) If they ask you how old you are, you're four.
(13) a. No, I won't say that!
    b. No, I'm grown up, you can't boss me around!

Even more, the speech acts involved with biscuit conditionals are not confined to an assertion and a command, they can also be a question and a request as Ebert, Enriss and Hinterwimmer (2008) illustrate with the following examples.

(14) a. If John is smart, why can't he find a job?
    b. If you see John, please say hello from me.

Ebert, Enriss and Hinterwimmer (2008) come up with another example that counters the assertion theories on biscuit conditionals. In the example in (15), the consequent clause cannot be regarded as a run-of-the-mill assertion since it is characterized as a lie in the antecedent clause.

(15) If you want to hear a big fat lie, George W. and Condi Rice are secretly married.

Although many previous studies on biscuit conditionals have attempted to explain them under the theories of speech act, none of them were quite satisfactory, encountering apparent counter-examples. This makes us shift our attention to new perspectives on them.

## 2.2. Topicality

Giving credit to Frey (2004), Ebert, Enriss and Hinterwimmer (2008) find contrasts between Hanging Topic Left Dislocation (HTLD) and German Left

Dislocation (GLD) as in (16), In doing so, they further claim that these two types of left dislocation constructions can be viewed in a parallel way with two types of conditionals.

(16) a. In case of HTLD, the left peripheral phrase is separated from the rest of the sentence by a short pause. In the case of GLD, there usually is no such pause.

b. GLD requires the presence of a resumptive pronoun which must be a weak d-pronoun (*der, den, die, das*, etc.). It is preferably realized in the prefield (i.e. in Spec., CP) of the matrix clause. The left peripheral element has to be in the same case as the resumptive pronoun. In the case of HTLD, the resumptive element may occur in the form of a personal pronoun, a weak d-pronoun, a strong pronoun like *dieser*, an epithet or a definite description. It can show up either in the prefield or in the middlefield of the clause. The left peripheral element may either be in the nominative or in the same case as the resumptive element.

c. GLD allows for binding of a pronoun contained within the left peripheral constituent by a quantifier in the matrix clause. In the case of HTLD, no such binding is possible.

According to Ebert, Enriss and Hinterwimmer (2008), Frey (2004) claims that GLD is characterized with aboutness topicality based upon the contrast shown below. A GLD sentence such as (18a) which has the requested entity in the left peripheral position can be an felicitous answer to the question in (17). However, a GLD sentence with a different entity from the aboutness topic set by the question in (17) produces an inappropriate answer as shown in (18b).

(17) What about the pastor?

(18) a. Der Pastor, der hat den Bürgermeister geohrfeigt.
　　　 The-NOM pastor RP-NOM has the-ACC mayor slapped.
　　　 'The mayor has slapped the pastor.'

b. #Den Bürgermeister, den hat der Pastor geohrfeigt.

The-ACC mayor RP-ACC has the-NOM pastor slapped.

'The mayor has slapped the pastor.'

On the other hand, HTLD marks frame setting topicality with the conventionalized expression such as "as for X" or "concerning/regarding X." In the following sentence, it is indicated that the information conveyed in the clause is merely relevant with respect to the frame topic, the pastor. That is, in the sentence in (19), the pastor is induced as the frame which makes the fact that the marriage sermon was wonderful merely relevant.

(19) As for the pastor, the marriage sermon was wonderful.

In sum, aboutness topicality marks that the sentence delivers direct content about the left peripheral element while frame setting topicality notes that the content of the sentence is merely relevant with respect to the left peripheral element.

An interesting point being made is that the following contrasts between biscuit conditionals and indicative conditionals resemble those in (16).

(20) a. In the case of biscuit conditionals, the left peripheral *if*-clause is separated from the rest of the sentence by a short pause. In the case of indicative conditionals with left peripheral *if*-clauses, in contrast, there is no such pause.

b. *then* can be regarded as a proform which relates back to the possibilities introduced by the *if*-clause. Crucially, biscuit conditionals do not allow for the presence of *then*, while indicative conditionals do.

c. While binding into the *if*-clause is possible in the case of indicative conditionals, it is not in the case of biscuit conditionals.

Based on the parallelisms between (16) and (20), Ebert, Enriss and Hinterwimmer (2008) claim that the left-peripheral *if*-clauses of indicative conditionals are instances of aboutness topicality just like GLD while those of biscuit conditionals are cases of frame setting topicality just like HTLD. Thus,

under this view, the typical biscuit conditional in (21a) can be paraphrased as in (21b).

(21) a. If you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.
b. As for the possibility that you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.

However, as Ebert, Enriss and Hinterwimmer (2008) themselves note, the limitation of this approach to biscuit conditionals can be found in the fact that indicative conditionals and biscuit conditionals can occur not only in the left periphery but also in the right periphery as repeated in (22) and (23), respectively. The correspondences between indicative conditionals and GLD, on the one hand, and between biscuit conditionals and HTLD, on the other, can be observed only with left-peripheral *if*-clauses, making the right-peripheral *if*-clauses distinct from the left-peripheral ones. Yet, this seems counterintuitive since indicative conditionals and biscuit conditionals in (22) and (23) do not make essential differences.

(22) a. If you want some, there are biscuits on the sideboard
b. If Bill hasn't moved them, there are biscuits on the sideboard.
(23) a. There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some.
b. There are biscuits on the sideboard if Bill hasn't moved them.

## 2.3. Disguised Conversation

Joh (2011) provides another new perspective on biscuit conditionals, paraphrasing the sentence in (1a) as in (24). In this paraphrase, the antecedent clause abbreviates the question that the speaker has in mind and his own answer about the question. With an anticipated answer of his own to a question that the speaker is curious about, the consequent clause is formed, and, under this context, the consequent clause can naturally deliver more than the asserted proposition. Under the context in (24), the consequent clause is not a plain assertion about the existence of some biscuits but is an implicature 'you can eat the biscuits on the sideboard,' which is conversationally derived under

the abbreviated *if*-clause underlyingly comprising of the speaker's question and his own answer about it.

(24) A: Are you hungry?
    B (Anticipated Answer): Yes, I am hungry.
    A: There are biscuits on the sideboard.

When a speaker has a particular question but believes that the most likely answer can be predicted, the speaker often does not want to go through the hassle of asking a question and waiting for the answer. In this case, the speaker instead decides to phrase his question and his prediction about the addressee's answer. Yet, this phrasing involves a certain degree of uncertainty so that the *if*-form presupposing the bit of uncertainty is chosen.

On the other hand, the indicative conditional in (25) cannot be paraphrased as in (26) since the speaker does not make any assumption about a particular state of mind of the addressee. In indicative conditionals, the speaker is merely neutral about the *if*-clause. Thus, in (25), the speaker has no presupposition about whether the addressee moved the biscuits or not. In other words, when it comes to the indicative conditional in (25), the speaker is merely presenting the two possibilities of moving biscuits or not moving biscuits with the equal probability. The neutral position of the speaker in cases of indicative conditionals is contrasted with biscuit conditionals where the speaker is particularly prone to a certain state or condition.

(25) If you didn't move them, there are biscuits on the table.
(26) A: Did you move the biscuits?
    B (Anticipated Answer): No, I didn't move them.
    A: There are biscuits on the table.

However a problem arises when (27) is taken into account. As shown in (28), the hypothetical conversation does not flow smoothly. In (27), the speaker does make the assumption that the addressee will need something later, but there is no connection between this assumption and the following statement *My name is Kate.*

(27)    If you need anything else later, my name is Kate.
(28)    A: Will you need anything else later?
        B: (Anticipated Answer): Yes, I will need something later.
        A: My name is Kate.

Similarly, the hypothetical conversation for (29) does not sound very plausible, as seen in (30). The connection between the question, *will they ask you how old you are*, and the answer, *you are four*, needs further elaboration.

(29) If they ask you how old you are, you're four.
(30) A: Will they ask you how old you are?
     B: (Anticipated Answer) Yes, they will.
     A: You're four.

Overcoming this problem but still adopting Joh's hunch that biscuit conditionals are disguised conversations, the paper will provide the missing connection between the hidden questions and answers through metonymic links. Among various metonymy types, speech act metonymy will be mainly used in explaining biscuit conditionals. Before addressing the issue directly, the basic concept of metonymy and speech act metonymy will be examined in the following section.

# 3. Metonymic Approach to Biscuit Conditionals

## 3.1. Metonymy

1) Referential Metonymy

Metonymy is a process where one concept refers to another conceptually contiguous concept in the same domain. In the expression, for example, *the wheels are parked outside, the wheels,* which are parts of a car, refer to the whole, *the car.* Since wheels are prominent parts of a car, they can be used to refer to the whole. Sometimes a whole is used to refer to its part. In the expression, *my*

*car is broken,* the expression *my car* refers to the engine part of the car.

(31) a. The wheels are parked outside.       (PART FOR WHOLE)
     b. My car is broken.                    (WHOLE FOR PART)

In another example, a container represents something in it, as in (32a). *This bottle* designates what is in the bottle. The reverse is also possible, as in (32b) where something that is contained in a container, *the milk,* represents its container, *the milk bottle.*

(32) a. This bottle is delicious.       (CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED)
     b.  The milk tipped over.         (CONTAINED FOR CONTAINER)
                         (Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006: 276)

The metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT and its reverse, EFFECT FOR CAUSE, are also prevalently used, as shown in (33). The expression *slow road* indicates slow traffic caused by the bad condition of a road. The expression *healthy complexion* refers to its cause, the state of good health.

(33) a. slow road                            (CAUSE FOR EFFECT)
     b. healthy complexion                (EFFECT FOR CAUSE)
                         (Radden and Kovecses 1999: 38)

2) Speech Act Metonymy[1]

In a speech act metonymy, one speech act is used for another. For example, a statement stands for a question and a question stands for a request, as in (34) and (35), respectively. The statement in (34a) means the question in (34b) and the question in (35a) means the request in (35b).

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[1] The metonymies, where one concept refers to another, are called 'referential' by Panther and Thornburg (1998, 1999) and Thornburg and Panther (1997). They suggest that there are other types of metonymy; predicational and speech act metonymy. Of these, predicational metonymy is not directly relevant to this paper and will therefore not be addressed.

(34) a. I am wondering if I can take you to the cinema on Friday night.

    b. Can I take you to the cinema on Friday night?

(35) a. Can you pass me the salt?

    b. Please pass me the salt.


For directive speech acts, Panther and Thornburg (1998, 1999, 2005, 2007) and Thornburg and Panther (1997) suggest the scenario in (36). A hearer's ability to perform an action (H can do A) and a speaker's desire for the action to be carried out by the hearer (S wants H to do A) are necessary preconditions for directive speech acts. The CORE of a directive speech act is that the speaker directs the hearer to perform the action. The RESULT is that the hearer has an obligation to perform the action. The hearer's performing the action is a non-necessary consequences (AFTER) of the directive speech act.


(36) Scenario for Directive Speech Acts

    (i) the BEFORE:       H can do A.

                        S wants H to do A.

    (ii) the CORE: S puts H under a (more or strong) obligation to do A.

        the RESULT: H is under an obligation to do A (H must/should/ought to do A).

    (iii) the AFTER: H will do A.

                           (Panther and Thornburg 1999: 336)


Indirect speech act arises when one of BEFORE, RESULT, AFTER conditions is used for the CORE part or the whole scenario. The expression, *John, you will take out the garbage,* is an indirect request. The expression itself is the AFTER condition, and it stands for the CORE condition of the directive speech act, or for the whole scenario (Panther and Thornburg 1999: 337).

A scenario for questions is shown in (37). For example, the indirect question, *You can tell me the way to the station,* expresses a hearer's ability to give information, which is a BEFORE condition. It is used to refer to the CORE of the question scenario or the whole scenario. Similarly, the indirect question, *I want you to let me know the way to the station,* is a BEFORE condition used to

refer to the CORE or the whole scenario.

(37) Scenario for Questions
 (i) the BEFORE: S has a desire to know something.
         S wants to get some information from H.
         H can give the information to S.
 (ii) the CORE: S asks H of something.
   the RESULT: H can choose to give an answer to S.
 (iii) the AFTER: H will give an answer to A.
              (Panther and Thornburg 1999: 336)

## 3.2. Speech Act Metonymy Explains Biscuit Conditionals

This paper explains biscuit conditionals based on speech act metonymy. The conditional clause indicates BEFORE conditions, *desire* and the consequent *desire for information that will lead to satisfaction*. Through metonymic linkage, the BEFORE conditions indicate the CORE condition of the question scenario, *inquiry*. The consequent clause indicates the AFTER condition, *an answer for the inquiry*. In other words, the *if*-clause refers to one's desire and the desire, in turn, refers to the inquiry for information that will lead to the satisfaction of that desire. The consequent clause refers to an answer to that inquiry.

In (38), one's hunger refers to one's desire to satisfy that hunger (*eating food*), and the desire refers to the necessity to find information that will lead to satisfaction (*knowing where he can find food*) and it, in turn, refers to the question that will bring about that information (*Where can I find food?*).

(38) There are biscuits in the cupboard if you are hungry.
(39) Conditional Clause
 a. If you are hungry
 b. Then you want to eat food (desire)
 c. Then you want to know where to find food
            (necessity to get information)
 d. Then your question to me is "Where can I find food?"
               (question)

(40) Consequent clause
    a. There are biscuits in the cupboard
    b. My answer to you is that there are biscuits in the cupboard
                                                   (answer)

The metonymic link is demonstrated in <figure 1>. The state that a hearer is hungry indicates the desire of eating, through CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy. The cause, *one's hunger*, refers to the result, *one's desire to eat*. In the question scenario, one's desire and the need to know how to satisfy that desire are necessary preconditions (BEFORE) for the question, *Where can I find food*? Therefore, the content of the biscuit conditional metonymically indicates a question-answer pair.



⟨Figure 1⟩ Metonymic Link of Conditional and Consequent Clauses

The metonymic links in the conditional and consequent clauses shown above follow the speaker's intention. A single desire can induce several

different questions. For example, in the case the speaker assumes the listener is hungry, the listener could want to buy some food, leading to the question *where can I get some money*, or he could want to make food, leading to the question *where can I find ingredients*, or he could want to ignore his hunger and focus on his work instead (though it sounds very unlikely, you never know), leading to the question *where can I find some quiet, well-lit place?* Among these possibilities, the speaker chooses the question that seeks the information the speaker wants to give to the listener.

In some cases of biscuit conditionals as in (41a) and (41b), the speaker's intention to give out information makes the speaker assume a very implausible question from the listener.

(41) a. If you are interested, there's a good documentary on PBS tonight.
     b. If your child is sick, the children's hospital is conducting a study of an investigational medication.

The conditional clause of (41a) has the following metonymic interpretation leading to the question *How can I get the information related to what I am interested in*? ((42d)).

(42) a. If you are interested in something, (state)
     b. Then you may want to know more about what you are interested in. (desire)
     c. Then you may want to know how to get the information related to your interest.
                    (necessity to know the way to satisfy the desire)
     d. Then your question may be "Where can I find a documentary program that will give me more information on my interest?"
                    (question)
     e. Then my answer to you is, there's a good documentary on PBS tonight.                    (answer)

The conditional clause in (41b) *if your child is sick* has similar steps of metonymic interpretation. Here, the assumed question is even more extremely

implausible, as in (43c).

(43) a. If your child is sick
b. Then you may want to know how your child can serve the public good (desire)
c. Then your question must be, "is there a way for my sick child to serve the public good?" (question)
d. Then my answer to you will be, the children's hospital is conducting a study of an investigational medication (answer)

In this case, the consequent clause is not an obvious answer to *how can my sick child serve the public good*. Therefore, it must be metonymically interpreted as shown in (44).

(44) a. The children's hospital is conducting a study of an investigational medication (fact)
b. Then the hospital needs subjects who can participate in the study of investigational medication (need/desire)
c. Then the hospital is an appropriate place you can visit with your child, in order to serve the public good
(the way your question is relevant to the need)
d. You need to visit the hospital with your child (answer)

When biscuit conditionals are unravelled to reveal the metonymic links within, they are like indicative conditionals. That is, the consequent is dependent on its condition, as shown in the contrast of (45a) and (45b).

(45) a. If your question to me is that ..., then my answer to you is that ....
b. If your question to me is not that ..., then my answer to you is not that ....

In (46), the metonymic link in the conditional clause is relatively simple. The conditional clause indicates the question *Who shot Kennedy* directly, which leads to the answer *Oswald shot Kennedy*.

(46) Oswald shot Kennedy, if that's what you're asking me.

(47) a. If that's what you are asking me

    b. Then your question must be "Who shot Kennedy?"    (question)

    c. Then my answer to you is that Oswald shot Kennedy.  (answer)

Some problematic cases in the previous analyses can also be explained in the same way[2]. The conditionals *if you need anything else later* and *if they ask you how old you are* are metonymically interpreted as questions *What is your name?* ((49d)) and *How old I should be?* ((50d)), through the metonymic chains of *from desire to necessity* as in (49b, 49c) and (50b, 50c) and *from necessity to question* (50c, 50d) and (51c, 51d). The consequent clauses are answers to the questions, *my name is Kate* (49e) and *you're four* (50e).

(48) a. If you need anything else later, my name is Kate.

    b. If they ask you how old you are, you're four.

(49) a. If you need something later

    b. Then you may need somebody to help you    (need & desire)

    c. Then you may think that I am the person who can help you and you may want to know my name

                (necessity to know the way to satisfy the desire)

    d. Then your question must be "What is your name?"   (question)

    e. Then my answer to your question is that my name is Kate

                      (answer)

(50) a. If they ask you how old you are

    b. Then you'll have to answer (obligation & desire)

    c. Then you may want to know what your answer should be.

               (necessity to know how to satisfy the desire)

    d. Then your question must be, "How old I should be?" (question)

    e. Then my answer to you is that you are four.     (answer)

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2) As indicated by anonymous reviewers, the claim that biscuit conditionals can be understood as question-answer pairs fails to explain cases such as (i), where the consequent clause contains a question or an imperative. Such cases will be addressed in future research.

  i) a. If I don't get to see you again before summer, have a nice vacation.

    b. If John is smart, why can't he find a job?

# 4. Conclusion

Intuitively speaking, in formulating a biscuit conditional, the speaker's intent is to dispense information given in the consequent clause. The question meant by the conditional clause is chosen by the speaker to be the question that will lead to the answer meant by the consequent clause. In other words, in order to provide the information that the speaker wants to provide, the speaker  poses a question that he thinks is relevant to the situation of the hearer in the conditional clause.

The paper claims that biscuit conditionals are indicative conditionals if their conditional and consequent clauses are metonymically interpreted as question-answer pairs. The conditional clause metonymically indicates a desire and the desire indicates the necessity to get the information to satisfy the desire. The desire and the necessity to get information, which are necessary preconditions (BEFORE conditions) of a question, refer to a question (CORE condition) in a Question Scenario, through BEFORE FOR CORE metonymy. The consequent clause refers to the answer to the question that the conditional clause poses. Therefore, the consequent clause acts as an AFTER condition of the Question Scenario.

If we hold these assumptions to be true, the conditional is interpreted as 'if your question must be that...' and the consequent is interpreted as 'my answer to your question is that...' If the question is not  that... then, the answer to the question shouldn't be that... It leads to the conclusion that biscuit conditionals are like indicatives, their consequents being dependent on their conditionals.

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